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ABSTRACT 
As engineers, we are trained to use logical, rational problem 
solving to insure our mines operate at maximum efficiency. We tend to 
use the same technical approach to design safety into all mining 
systems. This works well for machines, but not so much for the human 
component. Recent insights in the field of behavioral economics 
provide useful ideas for addressing the fact that we are driven by 
emotions more often than by rational thought. Understanding the 
nonrational aspect of human behavior is an important piece of any 
safety system design. 
INTRODUCTION 
The most common economic model is based on humans making 
rational decisions; that given the proper information, we will make a 
logical, rational decision based on what is best for ourselves (Ariely, 
2009, p. xviii). In many cases this is an accurate description of how we 
make decisions. As an engineer, I was trained to apply the precision of 
mathematics and logic to solve problems. As an engineering professor, 
I now teach this approach to bright young minds preparing them for a 
life of professional effectiveness as practicing engineers. 
That said, we are not only rational. Daniel Kahneman, winner of 
the Nobel Prize in Economics, describes a model for how we think 
(Kahneman, 2011). System 1 is the part of our mind that is fast, 
intuitive, and emotional; while our logical, slower, and deliberative mind 
is System 2. According to Kahneman’s model, System 1 runs 
automatically, most of what you think and do originates in System 1. 
System 2 takes over when things get difficult, including the application 
of math and logic, and the resolution (or avoidance) of conflict. 
As engineers, we would typically assume that we operate in 
System 2 mode most of the time. This is where the model becomes 
useful, for Kahneman points out two important aspects of the dynamic 
between the two systems in our mind. First, System 1 has biases, 
systematic errors that lead to answering questions with an easier 
answer (rather than a right answer) before System 2 is engaged. 
Second, we can be blind to the obvious, and also be blind to our 
blindness. Complicating things further, System 1 cannot be turned off 
(Kahneman, pp. 24-25). 
Returning to Dan Ariely, behavioral economics, also called 
judgment and decision making (JDM), is the study of the emotional 
aspect of decision making, when humans make choices that seem to 
defy logic and rationality. In fact, this became the title of his book on 
the subject, Predictably Irrational (Ariely, 2009). We are really far less 
rational than the assumptions of standard economic theory would 
suggest, and beyond that our irrationality is often predictable—it 
happens the same way, again and again (p. xx). We make decisions 
that have a rational veneer, but they originate in an emotional desire 
for something we crave deep down (p. 53). 
Understanding the dynamic of how emotion relates to logic is 
important when designing and implementing a safety system at a mine. 
While current approaches to safety stress the importance of each 
individual in developing a safe work environment, there are particular 
responsibilities that apply to managers and engineers. An example is 
the attitude of regulatory agencies. 
ROOT CAUSE 
There are many reasons ethically and practically to take safety 
seriously. A not trivial practical reason is the ever-present relationship 
between operating mines and the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA). We are all aware of the two-page Fatalgrams 
issued by MSHA to provide a brief description of every fatality that 
occurs in mining. 
What every professional working in mining should be familiar with 
is the subsequent report of investigation that is issued by MSHA at the 
conclusion of investigating a fatality. These documents are available to 
the public on their website. One section of particular interest to 
managers and engineers is the “Root Cause Analysis” section. This 
section specifically describes failures by management to prevent the 
fatality from occurring, beginning the analysis with some form of the 
following: 
“An analysis was conducted to identify the most basic 
causes of the accident that were correctable through 
reasonable management controls” (MSHA, 2012, p. 14). 
In this particular fatality, the 11th coal fatality in 2012, a truck 
driver died when he was ejected from his truck and struck by the truck. 
A toxicology report revealed a substance in his system which likely 
impaired his judgment, and he was not wearing his seatbelt. The 
resulting root cause analysis found four cases where the mine operator 
(that would be the management and professional staff) failed to 
provide proper training and instruction that would have prevented the 
fatality. This finding of failure on the part of management was despite 
the mine having a current, approved Part 48 training program. 
Now, I will readily admit that there are many instances where 
management is partly to mostly to blame for injuries and even fatalities 
at a mine site. The point I am trying to emphasize here is that 
regardless of culpability, management will be the first to be blamed in 
an MSHA report of investigation for a fatality. Whether it is an 
explosion at a silver mine (MSHA, 2013) with four root causes, or a 
machinery-related death at an underground coal mine (MSHA, 2014) 
with only one root cause, management will be identified as the source 
of a failure that led to the fatality. 
SYSTEM SAFETY 
One approach characterizing safety is to view the mine as an 
integrated system. An approach developed for a research project by 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is a 
safety system model that contains four components: economics, 
engineering, work environment, and human factors (Camm & Girard-
Dwyer, 2004). This model provides an approach to integrate the 
insights from behavioral economics into the overall system of a mining 
operation. 
Engineering 
Engineering design is a critical component of safety. Large strides 
have been made in reducing the number of mining fatalities over the 
previous decades, and improvements in engineering have played a 
significant role in these lives saved. The proper selection of equipment, 
work process, mine layout, and maintenance all contribute to the safe 
and effective operation of a mine. 
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Economics 
A mine must be profitable to continue to operate. From a safety 
standpoint, not only are the direct capital and operating costs 
important, but also costs associated with productivity, indirect costs, 
and intangible costs. Intangible costs include the costs not incurred by 
a safe operation that avoids injuries and fatalities. 
Work Environment 
In this model, work environment includes physical agents, 
chemicals, noise, dust and visibility. Many of these factors are 
specifically addressed by MSHA regulations, and it is the responsibility 
of the engineers on site to insure systems are in place to meet these 
regulatory requirements through work design and PPE use. 
Human Factors 
Training and work design are key components of human factors in 
a safety system. In addition, physical capability, perceptual motor skills 
and abilities, intellectual aptitude, and personality also contribute to the 
human factors part of the system. Individuals can continue to function 
in a poorly-designed system, but this will usually lead to increased 
stress, human errors, and under-utilization of equipment (Chapanis, 
1996, p. 19). 
Each of these four components interact in an efficient, properly 
designed safety system (figure 1.). 
 
Figure 1.  Model of factors used in systems engineering (Camm, 2006, 
p. 27). 
MANAGING CHANGE 
One of the dilemmas facing any professional is change 
management. Humans do not like change, particularly when they are 
in a system they know and think works just fine. McKinsey & Company, 
the well-known management consulting firm, has published a series of 
articles over the years providing guidance in instituting change in 
organizations. Lawson and Price (2003) outlined four conditions for 
change at the deepest level—cultural change. This is the type of 
change most managers seek when attempting to enhance the safety 
system at a mine. The four steps: 
1) A purpose to believe in—a compelling story that engages 
the emotions of workers. 
2) Reinforcement systems—any new systems, incentives, 
and processes must be consistent with the change. 
3) Skills training—companies often make the error of 
instituting a new system without adequately training workers 
to fit in the new system. 
4) Consistent role models—this starts at the top with 
management leading, but also includes colleagues modelling 
the desired new behavior. 
The Irrational Side 
To build upon the model of their colleagues, Aiken and Keller 
(2009) expanded on the four steps outlined above by addressing the 
irrational aspects of change management. Human nature often gets in 
the way of implementing even the best, most logically, rationally 
thought-out plans for change. First, what motivates you does not 
necessarily motivate your workers. Second, and related to the first, is 
that much of the energy spent telling would be better spent listening. 
This relates back to Ariely and Kahneman, if your workers do not feel a 
sense of participation in the story of the change, they are unlikely to be 
emotionally connected to the change. There should be a balance of 
risk and reward; “we are more willing to take risks to avoid losing what 
we’ve got than we are to gain something more. Some anxiety is useful 
when it comes to spurring behavioral change” (p. 104). 
Role Models 
Conventional managers believe that by acting as role models they 
can bring about the desired change. While the active participation of 
managers is important, they often mistakenly believe they already “are 
the change.” Why is it that leaders often commit themselves to be role 
models of the desired behavior, and then nothing happens? “The 
reason for this is that most executives don’t count themselves among 
the ones who need to change….The fact is that human beings 
consistently think they are better than they are” (Aiken & Keller, 2009, 
p. 105). 
Any attempt to institute change must be well thought out, logical, 
and rational. But, it must also recognize that humans do not always 
behave rationally. It must be perceived by all participants to be 
worthwhile, relevant to their lives, and fair. 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
The word profession is from the Latin professus, which means to 
affirm publicly. In the past, individuals who had mastered the esoteric 
knowledge of a discipline had the responsibility to use their power 
wisely and honestly (Ariely, p. 285). This still holds true today. Every 
person at a mine has an obligation to operate safely; but it falls on the 
professional staff of engineers and managers at a mine to insure the 
design, work process, and equipment fit together in a way to minimize 
the possibility of an injury or fatality. 
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